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I.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
A. Issues1
On December 20, 2004, NBC Nightly News reported that Khaleel Abood Saleh

Aldelami, Saddam Hussein’s lawyer, made comments that “Saddam praised the resistance in
Iraq, and he said the Iraqi people should resist the U.S. occupation in Iraq.”2 This memorandum
examines whether the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal (“SICT” or “Tribunal”)3 can place any
restrictions or enforce any punishments against either Saddam Hussein or his attorneys for
making such comments during his impending trial, either to the press or in the courtroom.
B. Summary of Conclusions
1. The Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal Can Place Restrictions on
Hussein’s Speech by Invoking its Inherent Power of Contempt

1

See E-mail from Eric H. Blinderman, Chief Legal Counsel, Regime Crimes Liaison Office, to Michael Scharf,
Professor and Director, Frederick K. Cox International Law Center, Case Western Reserve University School of
Law, IST Research: Additional 1st Question (Aug. 29, 2005, 15:46 EST) (on file with author). The focus of this
paper derives from the E-mail, which states:
Members of the defense team of Saddam Hussein frequently make statements to the international
press which they attribute to their client. These statements often call on members of the
insurgency to continue in their operations in Iraq and further incites [sic] violence. What
restrictions can the Tribunal place on both the defendant (during trial) and his defense counsel to
prevent the release of such statements? Is it consistent with international human rights law for the
Tribunal to place a “gag order” on the defendant or his counsel? Can the Tribunal sanction the
defendant or his counsel (either monetarily or with penal sanction) without violating international
human rights law? In answering this question, please balance the legitimate needs of security
against the equally legitimate needs for the Tribunal process to be open and fair and for the
defendant to exercise his right to free speech granted to him by various international instruments.
2

Transcript of NBC Nightly News, Saddam Hussein’s Lawyer’s Impressions of Him After Their First Meeting, Dec.
20, 2004, 18:30 EST, available at LEXIS, News & Business, News, All. [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 86 ]. The news transcript identifies the lawyer as “Khalil al-Duleimi,” which is most likely a
misspelling. “Khaleel Abood Saleh Aldelami,” the name listed on the Iraqi Special Tribunal website will be used
here. Iraqi Special Tribunal, Defense Counsels of Record, http://www.iraq-ist.org/en/defense/counsel.htm (last
visited Oct. 8, 2005) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 75].
3

The Iraqi Special Tribunal (hereinafter “IST”) was renamed the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal under a new law
which was passed but not yet promulgated. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE FORMER IRAQI GOVERNMENT ON TRIAL:
A HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH BRIEFING PAPER 3-4 n.8, available at http://hrw.org/backgrounder/mena/iraq1005/
iraq1005.pdf (Oct. 16, 2005) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 79]. In this paper, the Tribunal will be
referred to by its new name; however, names of old statutes which refer to the IST will not be changed.

1

Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights confers upon every
individual the right to freedom of expression through any medium of his choice.4 But, the right
to free speech is not unlimited. Article 19(3) provides that free speech can be subject to certain
restrictions if they are provided by law and necessary for the protection of the rights or
reputations of others or for the protection of national security, public order, or public morals.5
As a judicial body, the Tribunal has the ability to restrict speech via its inherent contempt powers
in order to protect the administration of justice.
If Hussein makes comments or causes his lawyers to make comments to either the press
or to the courtroom inciting the insurgency, the Tribunal will be able to restrict his speech
without violating Article 19 of the ICCPR. First, if the Tribunal invokes its contempt power to
restrict Hussein’s speech, the restriction will be provided by law. Second, the restriction will be
necessary in the new democratic society of Iraq. Despite the fact that Hussein’s encouragement
to crime is general, the surrounding circumstances, including his former position as the leader of
Iraq and the increasing violence committed by the insurgency, make it likely that Hussein’s
speech will in fact incite violence.
Because national security is vital to the success of a new democracy like Iraq, restricting
Hussein’s speech will satisfy a pressing social need. Nevertheless, the Tribunal must assure that
its restrictions on speech are proportionate to the threat, but since the threat of violent insurgency
is so great, the Tribunal will have some leeway in imposing restrictions. Ultimately, then,
speech from either Hussein or his attorneys inciting insurgency can be justifiably restricted via
the contempt power of the Tribunal.
4

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1996, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, art. 19(2), entered into
force March 23, 1976 (hereinafter “ICCPR”) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 12 ].
5

Id. at art. 19(3).

2

2. The Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal Can Place Restrictions on
Hussein’s Lawyers’ Speech by Invoking its Inherent Contempt
Power
The IST Rules of Procedure and Evidence require defense counsel to zealously represent
the accused6 but still abide by the codes of practice and ethics governing their profession.7 More
specifically, the International Bar Association’s (“IBA”) International Code of Ethics requires
lawyers to maintain the honor and dignity of their profession at all times, even in their private
lives, 8 to maintain due respect towards the court,9 and to never knowingly violate the law in
defense of a client.10 Many state bar associations have similar requirements.11
If Hussein’s lawyers make comments inciting the insurgency either in the courtroom or
out of the courtroom, the Tribunal will have the ability to restrict such comments via its inherent
contempt power. If Hussein’s speech can be permissibly restricted in contempt of court

6

IST R. PROC. & EVID. 49, available at http://www.iraq-ist.org/en/laws/rules.htm (hereinafter “IST Rules of
Procedure and Evidence”) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 14].

7

Id. at Rule 48.

8

International Bar Association, International Code of Ethics, Rule 2, first adopted in 1956 (1988) [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 10].
9

Id. at Rule 6.

10

Id. at Rule 10.

11

See, e.g., Israeli Bar Association, Bar Association Rules (Professional Ethics), ch. 2 (1986), available at
http://www.israelbar.org.il/english_inner.asp?pgId=10166&catId=372 (“An advocate shall represent his client
loyally, faithfully and fearlessly. He shall at the same time preserve full integrity, professional honor and the respect
for the Court) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 15]; The Law Society of England and Wales,
Solicitors’ Practice Rules of 1990, at Rule 1, last amended Feb. 9, 2005, available at
http://www.lawsociety.org.uk//documents/downloads/Profethics_PracticeRules.pdf (requiring a solicitor not do
anything which impairs her independence or integrity, her duty to act in the best interests of the client, or her duty to
the Court) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 18]; The Bar Association of Yugoslavia, Codex of
Professional Ethics of Attorneys-at-Law, at Rule 15-17 (1999), available at http://www.advokatskakomora.co.yu/english/act/codex.pdf (requiring an attorney to act professionally, abide by the law, and dedicate
himself fully to the case at hand) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 4].

3

proceedings, then likewise, Hussein’s lawyers can also be restricted for uttering the speech on
Hussein’s behalf. Although lawyers have a duty to protect the rights of their client by speaking
on his behalf, lawyers do not have the right to break the law in doing so. Also, lawyers, unlike
criminal defendants, have a special duty to maintain the honor and dignity of their profession.
Hussein’s lawyers will have violated this duty if they make comments either to the media or to
the court encouraging the insurgency, knowing such comments are likely to lead to increased
violence in Iraq. As a result, comments Hussein’s lawyers make during the pendency of trial
encouraging the insurgency in Iraq can be permissibly restricted by the Tribunal pursuant to its
inherent contempt power.
3. The Tribunal’s Best Option for Limiting Hussein and his Lawyer’s
Speech is to Impose a “Gag Order” or Prior Restraint on Speech,
But It Should Do So With Caution
Because of its overriding interest in protecting the administration of justice, the Tribunal
will be able to restrict speech from either Hussein or his attorneys which attempts to incite the
insurgency in Iraq pursuant to the Tribunal’s inherent contempt powers. Any restriction on
speech must meet the requirements of necessity and proportionality under Article 19 of the
ICCPR and subsequent case law. Also, whether a particular option for restricting speech is
appropriate will ultimately depend upon the result the Tribunal is seeking to achieve.
Hussein’s lawyers’ encouragement of the insurgency in Iraq would violate their
professional duty; therefore, the Tribunal could ask the Iraqi Bar Association to bring
disciplinary proceedings against them. Alternatively, the Tribunal may be able to bring
disciplinary proceedings against the attorneys themselves. Even if the Tribunal did have the

4

power to bring disciplinary proceedings, however, such proceedings would not immediately
prevent Hussein or his lawyers from inciting insurgency.
Sanctions, on the other hand, may be more effective in deterring future incitement
because the Tribunal can impose them sua sponte during contempt proceedings pursuant to its
general contempt power.12 With sanctions, however, the principle of proportionality must be
closely protected because courts are extremely wary of the chilling effect that sanctions might
have on future speech.13 In addition, as the former head of state, Hussein may not be easily
deterred by a mere monetary fine, despite the fact that his known assets were seized by U.S.
officials at the end of the war.
In the end, the Tribunal’s best option for preventing future incitement of the insurgency
during the trial is to place a “gag order” or other prior restraint on speech on Hussein or on his
defense counsel, or both. Again, courts have the power to impose prior restraints on speech
pursuant to their inherent contempt power.14 But, most legal systems recognize that prior
restraints on speech are extremely dangerous because they silence speech completely and
therefore strongly erode an individual’s right to free speech.15 Still, there are circumstances,
even under the more stringent U.S. standards, in which prior restraints on speech are permissible.
In this case, in which the security of the nation is threatened by the speech in question and the
other methods of restraining speech are unlikely to deter the dangerous speech, the Tribunal

12

See infra note 200 and accompanying text.

13

See, e.g., Nikula v. Finland, [2002] ECHR 31611/96, at ¶ 54 (“It follows that it should be primarily for counsel
themselves, subject to supervision by the bench, to assess the relevance and usefulness of a defense argument
without being influenced by the potential ‘chilling effect’ of even a relatively light criminal sanction or an obligation
to pay compensation for harm suffered or costs incurred.”) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 37].

14

See infra note 210 and accompanying text.

15

See infra note 211 and accompanying text.

5

should be able to place a prior restraint on either Hussein or his counsel’s speech in order to
prevent increased violence among insurgents.
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Prior to being captured and charged before the SICT, Saddam Hussein (“Hussein”) made

an apparent call to arms on an Arab television station broadcast. He brought his fellow
insurgents “good tidings that resistance and jihad cells have been formed on a wide scale inside
Iraq and they are fighting the enemy and the occupation.”16 He called on citizens of Iraq “to
provide cover for the heroic mujahidin and not to give the infidel invaders and their collaborators
any information about them and their activities.”17 Later, when Hussein made his first
appearance before an Iraqi judge, he seemed defiant, claiming that “this is all theatre by Bush to
help him with his election campaign. The real criminal is Bush.”18
Meanwhile, Hussein’s lawyers19 have been publicly making comments inciting
insurgency, which they attribute to their client. In July 2004, former defense panel member
Hussain Mjali, chairman of the Jordanian Bar Association, said he believed “there should be an
attack team, not a defence team. We should attack those who stole Iraq, and want to eradicate its
nationalists.”20 At the end of the year, NBC Nightly News reported that Khaleel Abood Saleh

16

Tim Reid, Saddam Tape Battle Cry to Iraqi People, TIMES (London), July 5, 2003, at 1, available at LEXIS,
News & Business, News, All [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 83].

17

Id.

18

Key Excerpts from Saddam in Court, BBCNEWS.COM, July 2, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr//1/hi/world/middle_east/3858919.stm (last visited Oct. 8, 2005) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
80].

19

In August 2005, Hussein fired all but one of his lawyers, Khaleel Abood Saleh Aldelami, who now serves as
Hussein’s sole legal counsel. Associated Press, Iraqi Court: Saddam Fires Lawyers, FOXNEWS.COM, Aug. 24,
2005 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 72]; Iraqi Special Tribunal, Defense Counsels of Record, supra
note 2 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 75].
20

Ahmed Janabi, Saddam’s Trial Divides Iraqi Opinion, ALJAZEERA.NET, July 15, 2004, http://english.aljazeera.net/
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Aldelami, Saddam Hussein’s lead lawyer of record, 21 told NBC News that “Saddam praised the
resistance in Iraq, and he said the Iraqi people should resist the U.S. occupation in Iraq.”22
While the Tribunal cannot punish either Hussein or his attorneys for comments made
before the beginning of his trial, this memo will consider the possibility that such comments may
be punished if made during the trial, either in public or in the courtroom itself.
III.

THE TRIBUNAL’S POWER TO RESTRICT COMMENTS
A. Tribunal’s Legislatively-Granted Powers
The IST Rules of Procedure and Evidence confer certain powers upon the judges of the

Tribunal to punish the misconduct of counsel. Under Rule 50(a), a Judge or Chamber can, after
a warning, impose sanctions against counsel if his conduct remains offensive or abusive,
demeans the dignity of the Tribunal, or obstructs the proceedings.23 A Judge or Chamber may
also, with the approval of the President, communicate misconduct of counsel to the professional
body, such as a bar association, which regulates conduct of counsel in his state of admission.24
Rule 50, however, does not mention if the conduct must occur within the courtroom or whether
counsel can be punished for their conduct outside of the courtroom. Most likely, this is because
Rule 50 merely codifies the court’s inherent contempt power, under which a court can restrict
behavior occurring inside or outside of the court if it interferes with the administration of

NR/exeres/BDE07C95-F791-49C3-A087-4569B9C68697.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2005) [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 78].
21

Iraqi Special Tribunal, Defense Counsel of Record, supra note 2 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 75].

22

Transcript of NBC Nightly News, supra note 2 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 86].

23

IST R. PROC. & EVID., supra note 6, at Rule 52(a) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 14].

24

Id. at 52(b).
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justice.25 Also, the Tribunal has the power to prosecute anyone who 1) attempts to manipulate
the judiciary or influence its functions, 2) conspires against the security of the homeland or
sabotages the regime, or 3) abuses his position and pursues policies that may lead to the threat of
war.26
B. Tribunal’s Inherent Powers
In addition to these legislatively-granted powers, many state courts have recognized the
judiciary’s inherent power to punish all forms of contempt.27 The crime of contempt is “sui
generis and is not within the ordinary process and scheme of the criminal law.”28 The power to
punish contempt is one of those powers essential to the administration of justice and the
maintenance of the rule of law.29
A court’s power to punish a party or his counsel for contempt, however, may be limited
depending on to whom the speech is aimed. Most notably, courts draw a distinction between
comments made concerning the prosecution of a case and comments directly attacking the court
itself. Because competent defense counsel should be critical of the prosecution, they have more
leeway in criticizing the prosecutor’s tactics and will not be seen as interfering with justice. In
contrast, direct verbal attacks on the court process itself are usually restricted because they have

25

See, e.g., Ahnee v. Dir. Pub. Prosecutions, [1999] 2 LRC 676 (P.C.) (finding that the power to punish all forms of
contempt is one of the definitive features of superior courts and underscores the judiciary’s essential role in
protecting the due administration of justice) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 23]; Pounders v.
Watson, 521 U.S. 982, 987 (1997) (“Longstanding precedent confirms the power of courts to find summary
contempt and impose punishment.”) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 39]. Cf. Re Kennedy (No.
2), [2004] 3 HKC 411, 413 (C.F.I.) (“Contempt proceedings should only be brought as a last resort when no
alternative powers of the court could be invoked.”) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 42].

26

Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, art. 14, available at http://www.iraq-ist.org/en/about/statute.htm (hereinafter
“IST Statute”) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 20].
27

See supra note 19 and accompanying text.

28

Ahnee, [1999] 2 LRC, at *3 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 23].

29

Id. at 6.
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less value and are more likely to threaten the proceedings. The distinction between the role of a
prosecutor and a judge “is manifested in common law jurisdictions by the fact that the crime of
contempt is largely aimed at statements or behavior directed at the court rather than an opponent
or a prosecutor.”30 Notably, courts in South Africa, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Italy all
make a distinction between criticism directed at the court and at a prosecutor, at least when the
prosecutor functions as an opponent in court.31
For example, in Nikula v. Finland, the European Court of Human Rights held that the
applicant’s right to freedom of expression had been violated when she was punished for claiming
that the prosecutor deliberately abused his discretion in a case in which she represented the
defendant.32 In so holding, the court emphasized that the applicant’s criticism was of the
prosecution’s strategy, as opposed to criticism focusing on the prosecutor’s professional or
personal qualities.33 But the court dismissed the notion that a defense counsel’s freedom of
expression is unlimited,34 and it reiterated the distinction between the role of the prosecutor as
the opponent of the accused and the role of a judge.35 The difference provides increased

30

Brief for Interights as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Nikula v. Finland, [2002] ECHR 31611/96, at ¶ 4.13,
available at http://www.interights.org/page.php?dir=News&page=Nikulabrief.php (noting that the distinction
between the role of a prosecutor and a judge “is manifested in common law jurisdictions by the fact that the crime of
contempt is largely aimed at statements or behavior directed at the court rather than an opponent or a prosecutor.”)
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 73]. Notably, courts in South Africa, Denmark, the Netherlands,
and Italy all make a distinction between criticism directed at the court and at a prosecutor, at least when the
prosecutor functions as an opponent in court. Id.

31

Id.

32

[2002] ECHR 31611/96, at ¶ 56 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 37].

33

Id. at ¶ 51.

34

Id. at ¶ 49.

35

Id. at ¶ 50.

9

protection for the accused and his or her attorney when they criticize a prosecutor, as opposed to
when they verbally attack the judge or the court as a whole.36
Similarly, the Tribunal also has the inherent power to punish either defendants or counsel
for comments which directly criticize the operation of the judiciary or threaten the administration
of justice. Exactly what type of punishments or deterrents the Tribunal can impose in contempt
proceedings will be addressed later in this memorandum.
IV.

RIGHT TO FREE SPEECH
A. Right to Free Speech in Iraq
1. Before the War
Due to various factors, including the polarization of Iraqi politics and the economic

sanctions which served to close much of the Iraqi population off from the rest of the world, the
rule of law in Iraq was uncertain even before the most recent war.37 Despite the existence of a
political environment hostile to individual rights, Section 26 of the Iraqi Interim Constitution of
1990 guaranteed its citizens freedom of opinion, press, assembly, and association.38 However,
even though many sections of the previous Iraqi Constitution assured citizens fundamental
human rights, they were often denied in practice.39
2. After the War
Article 13 of the current Provisional Constitution of Iraq protects the right to free
expression, free peaceable assembly, and freedom of thought, conscience, and religious
36

Id.

37

Sabah Al Mukhtar, The Rule of Law in Iraq: Does it Exist?, in THE RULE OF LAW IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE
ISLAMIC WORLD 71 (Eugene Cotran & Mai Yamani, eds. 2000) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 59].
38

INTERIM CONSTITUTION OF IRAQ (1990), art. 26, available at http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/iz01000_.html
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 9].
39

Al Mukhtar, supra note 37, at 78-79 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 59].
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practice.40 However, there is some concern from human rights groups that human rights will
continue to be unprotected in the new Iraqi regime.41 Until the new Iraqi government can
promulgate new criminal statutes, Iraq continues to be governed by the 1969 Penal Code, which
allows the government to place significant restrictions on an individual’s free speech to prevent
political dissent.42 Most likely, however, the new Iraqi government would not want to follow the
lead of the old, repressive regime. Instead, the new government will probably create new penal
laws which offer greater substantive protection to the right of free speech.
B. International Right to Free Speech
1. Free Speech as Customary International Law?
“Customary international law results from a general and consistent practice of states
followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.”43 Some scholars question whether freedom
of expression is protected by customary international law.44 Article 19, a human rights
organization specifically formed to promote freedom of expression worldwide45 and named after

40

Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period, art. 13, available at http://www.cpairaq.org/government/TAL.html (hereinafter “TAL”) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 17].

41

See, e.g., Memorandum from Article 19, Freedom of Expression Essential to Iraq’s Future: Iraq Media Law
Analysis (Feb. 2004), http://www.article19.org/pdfs/analysis/iraq-media-law-analysis.pdf (calling for changes in
Iraq’s free expression laws in order to bring it into line with international standards) [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 81].

42

IRAQI PENAL CODE, art. 208, 214, 215 (1969) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 13].

43

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 102(2) (1987) [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab __ ].

44

E.g., Leslie R. Strauss, Case Note, Press Licensing Violates Freedom of Expression—Compulsory Membership in
an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism, 5 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1986), 55 U. CIN. L.
REV. 891, 897 (1987) (“There is no clear customary international law regarding freedom of expression, particularly
with regard to journalists.”) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 69]; LARRY ALEXANDER, IS THERE A
RIGHT OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION? 4 (2005) (“The human right of freedom of expression is a posited, debatable
legal right, not a timeless moral right that preexists the instruments of international law.”) [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 54].
45

Article 19, About Us Overview, http://www.article19.org/about/index.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2005) [Reproduced
in accompanying notebook at Tab 71].
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the provision in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights protecting free speech, 46 argues that
the right to freedom of expression is universally recognized as a crucial underpinning of
democratic society.47 According to Article 19 of the UDHR, “[e]veryone has the right to
freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes the right to hold opinions without
interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and
regardless of frontiers.”
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that at least some provisions of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, though not inherently binding, have become binding
through state practice.48 Some scholars have even explicitly argued that “[t]he right of free
speech stands as a general norm of customary international law.”49
While most international agreements and state constitutions protect the freedom of
expression, the type and severity of restrictions which can be placed on that right varies from
state to state.50 This variance may prevent any rules about the restrictions on free speech from
becoming customary international law. Still, it is telling that the constitutions of many Islamic
nations, including Iraq and Iran, recognize the right to freedom of expression.51 To at least some

46

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 19, adopted by General Assembly Dec. 19, 1948 [Hereinafter
“UDHR”] [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 22].

47

Memorandum from Article 19, supra note 41, at 1 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 80].

48

Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 883 (1980) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 28].

49

THOMAS DAVID JONES, HUMAN RIGHTS: GROUP DEFAMATION, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND THE LAW OF
NATIONS 37 (1998) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 57].

50

See infra notes 37-68 and accompanying text.

51

JONES, supra note 49, at 40 n.81 (citing art. 24 of the 1979 Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, art. 26 of
the 1970 Iraqi Interim Constitution, art. 36 of the 1962 Constitution of the State of Kuwait, art. 23 of the 1973
Constitution of the State of Bahrain, art. 15 of the Constitution of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, art. 30 of the
1971 Provisional Constitution of the United Arab Emirates, art. 13 of the Provisional Constitution of Qatar, art. 13
of the 1969 Constitutional Proclamation of the Socialist’s People’s Libyan Arab Jamihiriya (Libya), and art. 8 of the
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extent then, freedom of expression seems to transcend cultural and religious norms and has
become a right common to modern legal systems. Moreover, most human rights agreements
protect an individual’s freedom of expression.52 Perhaps, then at least the basic concept of an
individual freedom to expression has become customary international law, but the Tribunal must
look elsewhere for an enforceable rule on restrictions on speech.
2. International Standard for Freedom of Speech: UDHR, ICCPR,
American Convention, European Convention, African Charter
a. Right to Free Speech Generally
In contrast to the UDHR, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is a
treaty which imposes formal legal obligations on state parties to respect the provisions therein.53
Over 150 states are parties to the ICCPR, including Iraq, which signed the ICCPR on February
18, 1969 and ratified it on January 25, 1971.54 According to Article 19, “[e]veryone shall have
the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek receive and impart
information and ideas of all kinds.”55 Therefore, Iraq is obligated under the treaty “to respect
and ensure to all individual within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction” the right to freedom
of expression.56

General People’s Congress Law No. 20 of the 1991 Consolidation of Freedoms) [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 57].
52

See infra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.

53

ICCPR, supra note 4, at art. 19 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 12].

54

Office of the High Commission on Human Rights, Ratification Status of ICCPR, available at
http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/4.htm (last updated Oct. 7, 2005) [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 82].

55

ICCPR, supra note 4, at art. 19 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 12].

56

Id. at art. 2.
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Regional human rights instruments protect the freedom of expression in similar terms.
According to Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, “Everyone has the right
to freedom of expression,” including “freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart
information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.”57
Article 13 of the American Convention on Human Rights protects the freedom to “seek, receive,
and impart information of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing, in print, in
the form of art, or through any other medium of one’s choice.”58 Finally, Article 9 of the African
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights simply provides that “[e]very individual shall have the
right to receive information” and “every individual shall have the right to express and
disseminate his opinions within the law.”59
b. Permissible Restrictions on the Right to Free Speech
i. Common Restrictions on Speech
Freedom of expression in international law, however, is not unlimited. In fact, it may be
restricted more easily than freedom of speech in the U.S.60 The ICCPR recognizes that the rights

57

European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, April 11, 1950, E.T.S. No.
5, art. 10, text completed by Protocol No. 2, E.T.S. No. 44, May 6, 1963 and amended by Protocol No. 3, E.T.S. No.
45, May 6, 1963, Protocol No. 5, E.T.S., Jan. 20, 1966, and Protocol No. 8, E.T.S. No. 118, March 19, 1985
[hereinafter “European Convention”] [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 8].
58

American Convention on Human Rights (“Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica”), Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, art.
13, entered into force July 18, 1978 [hereinafter “American Convention”] [Reproduced in accompanying notebook
at Tab 3].

59

African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), art. 9, entered into
force Oct. 21, 1986 [Hereinafter “African Charter”] [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 1].

60

E.g., Winfried Brugger, Ban on or Protection of Hate Speech? Some Observations Based on German and
American Law, 17 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 1 (2002) (discussing the differences between American law, in which hate
speech is viewed as a form of speech, and international law and many other legal systems, in which greater
protection is given to the dignity, honor, and equality interests of the targets of hate speech) [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 65]; J. Brian Gross, Russia’s War on Political and Religious Extremism: An
Appraisal of the Law “On Counteracting Extremist Activity,” 2003 BYU L. REV. 717, 738 (2003) (pointing out that
Russian law tends to adhere to the European approach to restrictions on speech which afford greater protection to
dignity and honor of the hearer than the U.S. approach) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 66].
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to freedom of expression carry with them special duties and responsibilities. The ICCPR, the
European Convention,61 the American Convention,62 the African Charter63 and many state
constitutions64 specify similar conditions under which the right to free speech can be restricted.
Under the ICCPR, speech “may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only
be such as are provided by law and are necessary:
(a) For respect of the rights and reputations of others;
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public
health and morals.”65
These types of provisions in the ICCPR, the European Convention, and the American
Convention have been interpreted as requiring restrictions on speech to meet a three-part test.
First, the court will look for an interference with the petitioner’s right to free speech. If there is
an interference with free speech, then the court asks whether the interference is justified. The
interference is justified if it is 1) prescribed by law, 2) supported by a legitimate aim, and 3)

61

European Convention, supra note 57, at art. 10(2) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 8].

62

American Convention, supra note 58, at art. 13(2) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 3].

63

Although the African Charter does not itself specify the conditions for placing restrictions on speech, the
requirements for restrictions were enunciated by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. African
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression in Africa, art. 2,
adopted on October 17-23, 2002, available at http://www.achpr.org/english/_doc_target/documentation.html?..
/declarations/declaration_freedom_exp_en.html (specifying that “any restrictions on freedom of expression shall be
provided by law, serve a legitimate interest and be necessary and [sic] in a democratic society) [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 2].

64

E.g., Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, sec. 1, enacted as Schedule
B to Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 5], as interpreted in Little
Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Minister of Justice, 9 BHRC 409, at ¶ 143 (Can. 2000) [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 35]; CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF NAMIBIA, art. 21(2) [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 6]; New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, 1990 No. 109, sec. 5 [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 19].
65

ICCPR, supra note 4, at art. 19(3) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 12].
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necessary to secure that aim. 66 In this context, “necessary” means that there must be a “pressing
social need” for the restriction. The State’s justification of the restriction must be “relevant and
sufficient,” and the restriction must be proportionate to the aim pursued.67
ii. Fewer Restrictions on Speech Permitted Under
American Convention
Arguably, the American Convention provides greater protection for an individual’s
freedom of expression than either the European Convention or the ICCPR. According to Section
2 of Article 13 of the American Convention, prior censorship is never permissible; liability can
be imposed only subsequently in certain enumerated circumstances.68 The Inter-American Court
interpreted Article 13(2) of the American Convention as imposing four requirements for
allowable restrictions on speech: 1) the existence of previously established grounds for liability,
2) the express and precise definition of these grounds by law, 3) the legitimacy of the ends
sought to be achieved, and 4) a showing that these grounds are “necessary to ensure” the ends.69
iii. Attempt at Codification: The Johannesburg
Principles
In an attempt to solidify international and legal standards relating to freedom of
expression, a group of experts in international law, national security, and human rights adopted

66

E.g., Shin v. Republic of Korea, Communication No. 926/2000, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/80/D/926/2000, at ¶ 7.2
(HRC 2004) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 46]; Incal v. Turkey, 4 BHRC 476, at ¶ 39-59 (Eur. Ct.
H.R. 1998) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 31]; Compulsory Membership in an Association
Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism, Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, at ¶ 39 (Series A, No. 5) (Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. 1985) [Hereinafter “Compulsory Membership”] [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 26]. See
also, Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 10: Freedom of Expression (Art. 19), ¶ 4, (1983)
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 74].

67

Supra note 53.

68

American Convention, supra note 58, at art. 13(2) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 3].

69

Compulsory Membership, supra note 66, at ¶ 39 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 26].
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the Johannesburg Principles on National Security, Freedom of Expression and Access to
Information on October 1, 1995.70 Mr. Abid Hussain, the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of
Opinion and Expression had endorsed the Principles in reports to the 1996, 1998, 1999, and 2001
sessions of the UN Commission on Human Rights, and the Commission has referred to the
Principles in their annual resolutions on freedom of expression every year since 1996.71 In
forming the Principles, the framers took into account relevant provisions of the UDHR, the
ICCPR, the African Charter, and American Convention, the European Convention, and the UN
Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary.72
Under the Johannesburg Principles, as under the ICCPR, European Convention, and
American Convention, a state cannot impose a restriction on an individual’s freedom of
expression unless it can demonstrate that the restriction is prescribed by law and necessary to
protect a legitimate national security interest.73 In contrast to the other international and regional
agreements, however, the Johannesburg Principles focus specifically on the circumstances under
which national security can be used as a justification for restrictions on free speech.
3. Broadest Protections for Freedom of Speech in the U.S.
Various courts and scholars have recognized that U.S. law offers the greatest protection
for free speech.74 Generally, the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution gives individuals a

70

The Johannesburg Principles on National Security, Freedom of Expression and Access to Information, Article 19,
adopted on Oct. 1, 1995 (hereinafter “Johannesburg Principles”) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab
16].

71

Id.

72

Id. at Preamble.

73

Id. at principle 1(d).

74

See, e.g., Kauesa v. Minister of Home Affairs, 1995 SACLR LEXIS 273, at *46-47 (Namibia) (recognizing that
the U.S. Supreme Court criteria for limiting free speech is narrower in its operation than restrictions authorized by
most modern constitutions, including the Namibian Constitution) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab
34]. But see Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Sorrow and the Pity: Kent State, Political Dissent, and the Misguided
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broad free speech right, and speech can be regulated by the states only in a few limited
circumstances. Discrimination against speech solely because of its content is presumed
unconstitutional,75 and U.S. courts are particularly wary of viewpoint discrimination.76 One of
the more infamous U.S. free speech cases is Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party of
America, in which the court held that the Nazi party could not be enjoined from displaying a
swastika symbol during a public demonstration.77 The court noted that it is firmly settled in the
U.S. Constitution that public expression of ideas may not be prohibited simply because they are
offensive to some of their hearers.78
Brandenburg v. Ohio continues to provide the rule for determining whether restrictions
on speech are permissible.79 In Brandenburg, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
constitutional guarantee of free speech does not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of
the use of force or of law violation except where 1) such advocacy is intended to incite imminent
lawless action, and 2) it is likely to incite or produce such action.80
To satisfy the first prong of the test, an individual must do more than merely advocate a
position. This issue was addressed in Brandenburg, in which a Ku Klux Klan leader was
Worship of the First Amendment, in THE BOUNDARIES OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION & ORDER IN AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 17, 32 (Thomas R. Hensley ed., 2002) (arguing that First Amendment interpretations and protections
in the U.S. vary with the strength of political currents) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 62].
75

Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 42].

76

Id. at 829 (“Viewpoint discrimination is thus an egregious form of content discrimination. The government must
abstain from regulating speech when the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker is
the rationale for the restriction.”).

77

373 N.E.2d 21, 26 (Ill. 1978) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 51].

78

Id. at 23. But see ARYEH NEIER, “Poisonous Evenhandedness,” in DEFENDING MY ENEMY: AMERICAN NAZIS,
SKOKIE CASE, AND THE RISKS OF FREEDOM 69 (1979) (highlighting the drawbacks of protecting the speech of
exclusionary groups) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 60].

THE

79

395 U.S. 444 (1969) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 24].

80

Id. at 447.
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convicted under the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism Act. The Act punished those who “advocate or
teach the duty, necessity, or propriety” of violence “as a means of accomplishing industrial or
political reform, or those who “justify” the commission of violent acts “with the intent to
exemplify, spread or advocate the propriety of the doctrines of criminal syndicalism.”81 The
court held the statute was unconstitutional because it punished mere advocacy, rather than
focusing on incitement to imminent lawless action.82
Under the second prong of the test, the speech must at least be clear enough to result in a
particular action. The issue of causation was taken up in Hess v. Indiana, in which the Supreme
Court overturned the disorderly conduct conviction of an anti-war demonstrator, who said,
“We’ll take the fucking street later” or “We’ll take the fucking street again.”83 The Court found
that the speech was not really advocating any specific action,84 and at most, it amounted only to
advocacy of an illegal action at some indefinite time in the future, which was not enough to
satisfy Brandenburg’s imminence requirement.85
In addition, any government regulation of the content of expression is subject to strict
scrutiny—the regulation will be permitted only if it is narrowly tailored to further a compelling
governmental interest, and the government must have no less restrictive alternative.86 If,

81

Id. at 448.

82

Id. at 448-449.

83

414 U.S. 105, 107 (1973) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 30].

84

Id. at 109.

85

Id. at 108.

86

E.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Board, 502 U.S. 105, 118 (1991)
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 45].
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however, the regulation is content-neutral, then a test considering the time, place, and manner of
the restriction is the appropriate measure of its constitutionality.87
It is less clear, however, under what circumstances threats can be restricted in accordance
with first amendment jurisprudence.88 In Watts v. United States, the Supreme Court overturned
Watts’ conviction for willfully threatening to take the life of the President.89 Although Watts
said, “If they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J.,”90 the
court found that the utterance was just a crude way of stating political opposition to the President
on subject of the draft and the Vietnam War.91 Consequently, the constitutionality of the antithreat legislation was never reached. Surely there would be circumstances in which a threat
would be so imminent and threatening that the U.S. Supreme Court would be willing to restrict
the threatening speech, but as of yet, the Court has not addressed the issue specifically.
V.

RESTRICTIONS ON THE RIGHT TO FREE SPEECH
As already discussed, most international human rights documents and many state

constitutions put limits on the protection of free speech. So, in the ICCPR, the American
Convention, and the European Convention, restrictions can be placed upon an individual’s right
to free speech if it is 1) prescribed by law, 2) supported by a legitimate aim, and 3) necessary to
secure that aim.92

87

Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 713 n19 (2000) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 31].

88

See Holly Coates Keehn, Terroristic Religious Speech: Giving the Devil the Benefits of the First Amendment Free
Exercise and Free Speech Clauses, 28 SETON HALL L. Rev. 1230, 1248-1249 (1998) (noting that almost every state
and the federal government have passed laws criminalizing the making of threats, but these laws have not yet faced
rigorous First Amendment review) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 67].
89

394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 52].
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A. Prescribed by Law
As stated earlier, the court can restrict an individual’s freedom of speech by invoking its
contempt power to protect public order and the administration of justice.93 The contempt power
is inherent to the judiciary since courts need to be able to protect the process occurring in their
courtroom.94 The court’s contempt power is relatively broad; however, it is still subject to the
limitations of Article 19(2) of the ICCPR. In other words, a court cannot hold someone in
contempt for their speech unless the contempt proceedings are supported by a legitimate aim and
are necessary to secure that aim.95 Most courts have found that a court can only limit an
individual’s right to free speech when the restriction is necessary to protect the administration of
justice or public order.96
In Lovell v. Australia, Lovell, an industrial advocate of a trade union, publicly revealed
the contents of documents involved in the litigation, even though the documents were never
introduced into evidence.97 The court held that the restriction was supplied by the law of
contempt of court and was necessary for achieving the aim of protecting the rights of others and
for protecting the public order. Therefore, the author’s conviction for contempt was a
permissible restriction on his freedom of expression, and the court had not violated Article 19 of
the ICCPR.
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Similarly, in Ahnee v. the Director of Public Prosecutions, the Privy Council of Mauritius
upheld a journalist’s conviction for contempt for publishing an article which accused a judge of
impropriety in an ongoing case.98 The court found that the Mauritius Constitution gave the trial
court such powers as were necessary to discharge their functions, and it was necessary for the
judiciary to have the power to enforce order and to protect the administration of justice against
contempt.99 Because the specific offense of scandalizing the court was narrowly defined and
existed solely to protect the administration of justice and the public interest, the offense was
necessary in a democratic society.100
B. Necessary in a Democratic Society
In practice, the outcome of most court cases turn on the necessity of the restriction
imposed on speech, specifically whether there is a pressing social need and whether the
government’s means are proportionate to their ends. Essentially, courts engage in a balancing
test, weighing the individual’s right to freedom of expression against the state’s interest in
national security and in protecting morals.
One of the most widely cited cases in which the European Court of Human Rights upheld
a restriction on freedom of speech is Handyside v. United Kingdom.101 In that case, Handyside
was punished for publishing a children’s guidebook, “The Little Red Schoolbook,” which
contained information about sexuality, drugs, and authority.102 Looking at the book as a whole,
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the lower court found that it tended to deprave and corrupt a significant number of children likely
to read it.103 Affirming, the European Court of Human Rights held that even the government’s
decision to seize copies of the book was justified “as a temporary means of protecting the young
against a danger to morals.”104 As one of the first cases in which the European Court of Human
Rights upheld a restriction of speech, Handyside was important in defining
1. Pressing Social Need
i. Generally
A state government cannot restrict an individual’s freedom of expression unless there is a
pressing social need for it to do so. A general concern with the effect of political dissent does
not constitute a pressing social need. Usually, the speech must pose a very specific threat to
public morals or national security in order for the state to be justified in restricting it.
In Shin v. Republic of Korea, a professional artist was convicted for an alleged breach of
a National Security law for painting a canvas-mounted picture entitled “Rice Planting
(Monaeki).”105 The painting contained certain political imagery, and the government thought the
picture constituted “enemy-benefiting expression.”106 Although the state had identified a
national security justification for the limits on Shin’s speech, the court held that the State must
specifically demonstrate the exact nature of the threat caused by the author’s conduct, “as well as
why seizure of the painting and the author’s conviction were necessary.”107 In the absence of an
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individualized justification for why the measures taken here were necessary, the Committee
found a violation of Shin’s right to freedom of expression under Article 19, paragraph 2 of the
ICCPR.108
ii. Incitement
In incitement cases in particular, courts will often focus on the nature of the threat created
in order to determine whether placing restrictions on it is necessary. The dangers of incitement
lie “in the potential for a series of these acts to create an overall environment conducive to
criminal activity and violence, where terror and subversion of the rule of law and the democratic
order reign.”

109

Some of the factors relevant to whether speech urging the commission of a

crime can be limited are 1) the success or likely success, 2) the seriousness of the crime
encouraged, 3) the public nature of the encouragement, 4) the nature of its appeal, and 5) the
mood of the audience.110 In Israel, a country which has a long, turbulent history with terrorism, a
publication allegedly inciting terrorism or violence can only be restrained when there is a “near
certainty” of real harm to national security.111
Two common circumstances under which courts are willing to uphold a restriction on
free speech is when the individual in question is specifically inciting violence or the climate is
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such that even general encouragement is likely to result in violence. Generally, courts and legal
scholars draw a distinction between general urgings to commit crime and specific incitement.
Not surprisingly, the second category of incitement—general incitement—is usually the
most contested. General urgings to crimes are usually less likely to produce results than specific
encouragements, and when they do lead to crime, their influence may be hard to trace.112 Still, it
is possible that some general encouragements, “say to murder public officials or members of a
racial minority or to forcibly overthrow the government, will be extraordinarily dangerous and
will warrant a narrow prohibition.”113
Courts must look closely at the circumstances surrounding a particular case to decide if
a general encouragement to commit a crime is threatening enough to justify restrictions on an
individual’s freedom of speech. In many courts, a general incitement cannot be restricted unless
the surrounding circumstances make the speech likely to incite violence.
a. When General Incitement Cannot Be Restricted
The case law from state courts, regional courts, and international judicial bodies supports
the proposition that general urgings to crime usually do not pose a specific enough threat to
national security to justify limiting an individual’s right to free speech. For example, protests
with violent overtones are rarely restricted because the threat they usually pose is general.
In Police v. O’Connor, the trial judge made an order prohibiting the reporting the trial
proceedings because the criminal defendants in the case were allegedly committing their crimes
in protest of abortions. The trial judge became aware that the defendants were employing a
tactic of remaining silent in order to gain press. When each defendant was sentenced and asked
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to stand as their name was called, the defendants remained silent but the accused held up a
picture of a 12-week-old fetus and said, “We must not forget about this little fellow.”114 The
court believed that denial of publicity could deter future re-offending by other pro-life
activists.115 Section 138 of the Criminal Justice Act gave the court power to forbid the
publication of reports of trial proceedings and even to exclude certain persons from the
courtroom in the interests of justice, or of public morality, or of the security or defense of New
Zealand.116
However, the New Zealand High Court at Auckland struck the ban down as contrary to
freedom of expression.117 The court reasoned that most people who viewed the courtroom
protests would understand that there are legitimate means of seeking legal change, and they
would not necessarily be incited to violence simply by viewing the protests.118 However, the
court noted that “[t]he possibility exists at some future date courtroom protagonists may adopt
tactics so extreme in their purpose or abuse of the Court process that the public interest would
not be served by permitting the tactics to be publicized.”119 In other words, while the defendants
may have been encouraging violence against abortion clinics on a general level, their silent
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protests did not pose a specific enough threat to national security or the administration of justice
to justify restrictions on their freedom of speech.
Similarly, in Surek v. Turkey, the European Court of Human Rights found that views of
PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan)120 members published in a local newspaper constituted
political speech and could not be construed as incitement to violence.121 One of the articles in
question reported an interview with the PKK’s second-in command, who alleged that the Turkish
State was massacring Kurds, and said “we [the PKK] will fight in order to stay where we are.”122
The court reasoned that, when taken as a whole, the texts did not incite violence, but were merely
a reflection of the resolve of an opposing political group to pursue its goals.123 The court noted
that under Article 10(2) of the European Convention, there is little scope for restrictions on
political speech or debate on questions of public interest.124
Even the Nuremburg Tribunal was unable to convict Hans Fritzsche, a radio
commentator for the Nazi regime, for inciting crimes against humanity by deliberately falsify
news to arouse hatred against Jews in the German population.125 Ultimately, the Tribunal
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decided to acquit Fritzsche because although he clearly encouraged anti-Semitism, his “speeches
did not urge persecution or extermination of the Jews.”126
b. When General Incitement Can Be Restricted
General incitement can be restricted when the surrounding circumstances are such that
even a general encouragement to violence will be likely to result in actual violence.
In Zana v. Turkey, Mehdi Zana, a former mayor of Diyarbakir, told journalists in an
interview, “I support the PKK127 national liberation movement; on the other hand, I am not in
favour of massacres. Anyone can make mistakes, and the PKK kill women and children by
mistake.”128 Since 1985, disturbances raged in south-east Turkey between the government’s
security forces and members of the PKK, and ten of the eleven provinces of south-east Turkey
have been subject to emergency rule since 1987.129 Ultimately, the Diyarbakir National Security
Court sentenced Zana to twelve months imprisonment for defending an act punishable by law as
serious crime and endangering public safety.130
Upholding the judgment, the European Court of Human Rights found that “a State faced
with a terrorist situation that threatened its territorial integrity had to have a wider margin of
appreciation than it would have if the situation in question had consequences only for
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individuals.”131 The court admitted that the language in Zana’s statement was contradictory
because he was both supporting the PKK, “a terrorist organization which resorts to violence to
achieve its ends,” and opposing massacres.132 But, the comment had to be looked at in the
context. Given the history of terrorism in Turkey, “the support given to the PKK by a former
mayor of Diyarbakir, the most important city in south-east Turkey, in an interview in a majority
national daily newspaper, had to be regarded as likely to exacerbate an already explosive
situation in that region.”133 As a result, the penalty imposed on Zana was proportionate to the
legitimate aims pursued, and Turkey had not violated Article 10 of the European Convention.134
1. Proportionality
Whenever a government is fashioning a restriction to an individual’s right to free speech,
it must ensure that the restriction is proportional to the interest sought to be attained. So, for
example, if the court places a sanction on a man because his speech threatens national security,
the sanction must not be disproportionate to the national security threat posed by the speech.
For example, in Kauesa v. Minister of Home Affairs, the Supreme Court of Namibia
invalidated a restriction on speech because it was not carefully designed to achieve the state’s
objective. In Kauesa, a policeman participated in a panel discussion on affirmative action and
restructuring of the police force in Nambia.135 Soon after, he was charged with contravening the
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Police Regulations, which imposed a disciplinary offense on a police officer who commented
unfavorably on the administration in public.136 The Supreme Court of Namibia applied a threepart proportionality test: 1) the measures adopted must be carefully designed to achieve the
objective, 2) the measures must not be arbitrary, unfair, or irrational, and 3) there must be
proportionality between the effects of the measures and the objective.137 Ultimately, the court
found that the regulation was overly broad.138 Even police officers had a right to enter into a
debate about matters of great concern to the public.139
VI.

CAN THE TRIBUNAL INTERFERE WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN’S RIGHT
TO FREE SPEECH?
A. Application of the International Standard
Since Iraq is a party to the ICCPR,140 it makes most sense to apply the standard

promulgated by Article 19 to any restriction that the Tribunal might place on Hussein’s right to
free speech. Under the ICCPR standard, a court will first consider whether the government
action constitutes a limitation on speech. If it does, the court will only consider the limitation
justified if it is prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society. A restriction is
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necessary only if there is a rational connection between the restriction and the objective, a
pressing social need for the restriction, and the restriction is proportional to the threat posed.141
1. Limitation on Speech
If the Tribunal invokes its inherent contempt power to place a “gag order” restriction on
Hussein’s speech or imposes a monetary fine on Hussein to punish him for speech already
uttered, there is little question that it will be imposing a limitation on Hussein’s speech.
2. Prescribed by Law
In order to place restrictions on Hussein’s right to free speech, the Tribunal must first
have power to restrict speech at all. Like any other judicial body, the Tribunal has inherent
contempt power to punish behavior that jeopardizes the administration of justice.142 Although
some states believe that contempt proceedings should only be used as a last resort,143 the
Tribunal could argue that it has few other powers to prevent the interference with justice that
Hussein’s speech will cause.
Under Article 14 of the IST Statute, the Tribunal can prosecute Hussein for attempting to
manipulate the judiciary or conspiring against the security of the homeland, but prosecution is
unlikely to deter Hussein’s speech since he is already being prosecuted on other charges. As a
result, the Tribunal’s best means to prevent interference with the administration of justice in a
timely manner is to invoke its contempt powers. Ultimately, any restriction that the Tribunal
places on Hussein’s speech will be prescribed by the law of contempt of court.
3. Necessary in a Democratic Society
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The more complex issue is whether it is necessary to restrict Hussein’s speech in a
democratic society. So far, Hussein has not made a direct incitement to violence; in other words,
he has not called on the insurgency to kill particular people at a particular time. Rather, his calls
to violence have been general encouragements of the insurgents in Iraq. In order to find that a
restriction on such general urging to crime is necessary to protect national security, the Tribunal
will have to prove that because of the attendant circumstances, the speech is likely to incite
violence.
1. Pressing Social Need
Many courts have recognized that national security is a pressing social need, especially in
a country with a history of combating terrorism.144 Like Turkey, Iraq has had a long history with
both internal and external conflict. Most recently, groups of Iraqi insurgents have staged
bombings and attacks in response to the U.S. invasion and the overthrow of the former Iraqi
regime. The insurgent attacks have been escalating over the last few months, and U.S.
government officials expect their continued escalation.145 Meanwhile, the government in Iraq is
in limbo, with the vote on a new constitution pending, and some citizens still question the
government’s legitimacy.146 Given the volatility of the situation in Iraq, speech encouraging the
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insurgency even in general terms will be more likely to incite actual violence, specially coming
from the former President of Iraq. All of these circumstances would add to the imminence and
dangerous of Hussein’s speech, creating a pressing social need to restrict his speech.
However, Hussein will argue that words such as “praising” the resistance in Iraq or
telling Iraqi people to “resist” the U.S. occupation are too vague to create any real dangers and
therefore any pressing social need to restrict such speech. But, as the various cases from Turkey
point out, context makes all of the difference. In Surek v. Turkey, a restriction on speech was
struck down because in the context of a newspaper article interview and lacking any direct
encouragement to violence, the speech constituted political speech rather than incitement.147 On
the other hand, in Zana v. Turkey, a restriction on speech was upheld when a former mayor was
the speaker, the comments were made at a public press conference, and the violent language was
ambiguous.148
The Tribunal will be able to argue that Hussein’s speech falls more in line with the
speech in Zana than that in Surek. Although Hussein’s words are relatively vague, he is
encouraging the insurgency in Iraq, which is widely known to be a violent, not peaceful
movement. The insurgency is a political group in so far as they advocate changing the current
political structure of Iraq by expelling U.S. and other foreign forces and reinstating the former
Iraqi regime. However, their reputation for violence and terrorism is as well-known as that of
the PKK in Turkey. Moreover, Hussein’s former position as president increases the
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persuasiveness of his speech, just as Zana’s speech was more influential because he was the
mayor of a strategically important Turkish town.
Also, the court’s power to restrict Hussein’s speech might depend on the venue in which
he chooses to voice it. For example, if Hussein encourages insurgency in the courtroom, the
Tribunal will have a stronger argument that Hussein is interfering with the administration of
courtroom proceedings since his actions will directly affect the proceedings themselves.
Out of the courtroom, though, the Tribunal will have a harder time arguing that they have
the power to restrict Hussein’s speech to protect the due administration of justice, but the
argument is not impossible to make. On the other hand, inciting the insurgency outside of court
does not directly attack Hussein’s ongoing courtroom proceedings. However, it does interfere
with them insofar as the speech essentially calls for the overthrow of the current government. To
some extent, inciting insurgency does insinuate that the Tribunal itself is illegitimate and must be
overthrown to obtain true justice. Also, if Hussein encourages insurgency in a public forum, like
a press conference, the speech might be equally or even more threatening as doing so in the
courtroom since it can reach a wider audience. In fact, encouraging the insurgency in a public
forum may be strong evidence of intent to incite violence by choosing a forum which reaches the
maximum number of hearers.
Ultimately, then, the Tribunal should be able to make a strong case that, although
Hussein’s speech appears to be a general call to combat the foreign forces in Iraq, it is more than
mere political speech. Given the escalation of violence among insurgent groups in Iraq and the
instability of the current transitional government and Iraqi Constitution, a call from Hussein even
encouraging the insurgency is likely to pose a real and pressing threat to the national security of
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Iraq. As a result, the Tribunal would have a pressing social need to either prevent Hussein from
uttering such speech or punish him for speech already uttered.
2. Proportionality
In order for the Tribunal to impose any restriction on Hussein’s speech, the restriction
must be proportional to the interest in security being protected. Of course, whether a measure is
proportional will depend upon which restriction the court chooses to impose (a “gag order,”
sanction, etc.), the circumstances in which the speech arises, and the nature of the speech itself.
Still, the Tribunal should have some room to place substantive restrictions on Hussein’s speech
because it is so threatening to the new democratic order in Iraq. By encouraging the insurgency,
Hussein is potentially threatening the existence of the judiciary itself as well as the current state
of democracy in Iraq. Even a “gag order,” a prior restraint on speech, would be justified to
prevent such a great threat from ripening into harm.149 Of course, there are some limits on the
restrictions the Tribunal could place on Hussein’s speech. Strong punitive measures, such as
fines or even detainment, may not be permissible unless Hussein repeatedly ignores the
Tribunal’s orders limiting his speech. The availability of specific restrictions on speech will be
discussed later in this memorandum.
B. Derogation Clause in ICCPR
According to Article 4 of the ICCPR, a state has the right to derogate from the protection
of free speech in a time of a public, declared emergency which threatens the life of the nation.150
However, the derogation must be strictly required by the exigencies of the situation and must not
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be inconsistent with the state’s other obligations under international law.151 Finally, the state
availing itself of the right of derogation must inform other state parties through the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations.152 One of the most common derogations made from rights
protected under the ICCPR is from Article 19.153 Generally, states are given a wide margin of
appreciation in determining whether a national emergency exists; however, one must be declared
in order for a derogation to be justified.154
Although the Tribunal could argue that Iraq remains in a state of national emergency
given the high level of insurgency and as a result, it has the right to derogate from the Article 19
of the ICCPR, this argument is unlikely to prevail. There is no evidence that Iraq has reported a
state of national emergency to the UN Secretary-General, and it is essential for states to give a
legal justification for declaring a state of emergency, which Iraq has not done.155 But, even if
Iraq declares national emergency and provides a valid justification for doing so, Iraq should be
wary of suspending its human rights protections for an indefinite period of time. Since Iraq is a
new, developing democratic state, it would jeopardize its legitimacy as a democracy if it were to
suspend vital civil liberties, such as the right to freedom of speech, at this early stage in its
development.156
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C. Application of U.S. Standard
It is less likely that the Tribunal could permissibly restrict Hussein’s speech under U.S.
free speech jurisprudence, which only permits the restriction of speech which is 1) intended to
incite imminent lawless action and 2) likely to incite or produce such action.157
Under the first prong, it may be difficult to define Hussein’s speech as inciting imminent
lawless action rather than just advocating general action or even simply a political view. Even
during times of war, the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the use of violent language simply
as a way of expressing political opposition.158 Here, too, the U.S. standard might call for a more
permissive approach to Hussein’s speech. Given that it will be made during his criminal
prosecution in opposition to what he believes are illegal invading forces, the court might find that
Hussein’s speech is essentially political, not violent. Similarly, while Hussein may be inciting
the insurgency in general, so far, his pleas have not advocated imminent lawless action: he never
names a particular time or day for the attack nor has he singled out specific targets. Rather, his
calls for violence are generalized, and not much different than Hess’ utterance of “We’ll take the
fucking street later.”159
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Even if the Tribunal finds that Hussein’s call to continue the insurgency is an imminent
call to lawless action, it will have a more difficult time proving that such a call is likely to
produce such lawless action. Since the insurgency has continued to escalate its attacks before
Hussein’s trial, it will be hard to prove that any particular call to arms he makes will lead to
increased attacks or make violence more likely.
Finally, any contempt proceedings against Hussein for inciting insurgency will constitute
a regulation of the content of Hussein’s speech and will consequently be subject to strict
scrutiny.160 So, the Tribunal will have to prove that invoking its contempt power to restrict
Hussein’s speech will be necessary to satisfy a compelling state interest. Surely, preventing the
escalation of insurgency attacks would be a compelling state interest, but the Tribunal will have
to prove that the means it will use to restrict Hussein’s speech is the least restrictive.
Regardless of the barriers to restrictions on speech in U.S. law, the Tribunal should not
adopt the U.S. standard because it does not enjoy the same international following of the ICCPR
standard. The European Convention, American Convention, and the African Charter all follow
the ICCPR standard for limitations on speech. Moreover, some state courts have explicitly
acknowledged the differences in the U.S. standard and rejected it in favor of the more commonly
followed international standard.161 Many of the differences between American free speech law
and other legal systems stem from the particular histories of each country. The Founders of the
U.S. were particularly concerned about protecting the speech they could not voice under British
rule, while countries like Germany and South Africa feel more comfortable restricting speech in
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their respective battles against bigotry and racism.162 Given the previous conflicts among
various groups in Iraq, it seems logical that it too would adopt the international standard’s more
permissive approach to free speech restrictions.
VII.

THE SPECIAL ROLE OF THE LAWYER
A. Duty to Argue Zealously for Client

Perhaps the most essential role of the lawyer in the judicial system is to argue zealously
for his client.163 If the lawyer is deprived of his ability to passionately defend his client’s
interests, an individual’s right to a fair trial will be jeopardized.164 In order to give the lawyer
some leniency in arguing for his client, most domestic bar associations, international, and
regional bodies create rules to protect a lawyer’s right to argue zealously for his client.
Rule 49 of the IST Rules of Procedure and Evidence require defense counsel to zealously
represent the accused.165 Similarly, the UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the
Treatment of Offenders adopted Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, under which lawyers
have a duty to assist their clients in every appropriate way,166 and they must always loyally
respect the interests of their clients.167 Also, most state’s bar associations impose similar duties
upon lawyers to represent their clients to the best of their professional ability.168
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With this strong duty to protect their clients’ interests, lawyers are also given
considerable leeway to argue zealously for their clients in and out of the courtroom. However, in
exercising these rights, lawyers must always conduct themselves in accordance with the law and
the recognized standards and ethics of the profession.169
The European Court of Human Rights protected a defense counsel’s right to free speech
in Nikula v. Finland, despite the fact that Nikula wrote a scathing memorandum criticizing the
prosecution entitled “Role manipulation and unlawful presentation of evidence.”170 The court
reasoned that, as defense counsel, Nikula had a right to express such options, and the prosecutor
was obliged to tolerate such criticism.171 Moreover, Nikula’s comments were confined to the
courtroom, as opposed to criticism voiced in the media.172 The court believed that it should
primarily be the counsel’s responsibly, with supervision by the bench, to assess the usefulness of
a defense argument without the influence of a potential “chilling effect” of even a relatively light
sanction or an obligation to pay compensation or costs.173 In the end, the restrictions on Nikula
failed to answer any pressing social need and ordering her to pay damages and costs was not
proportionate to the legitimate aim sought to be achieved.174
The Basic Principles also recognize that lawyers, like other citizens, have the right to take
part in public discussion of matters concerning the law without suffering restrictions on their
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lawful actions.175 The Council of Europe’s Recommendation on the Freedom and Exercise of
the Profession of Lawyers even more strongly asserts that all necessary measures should be taken
to protect and promote the lawyer’s freedom of exercise without improper interference from
authorities.176 Courts have also traditionally protected a lawyer’s right to demonstrate in public.
In Ezelin v. France, the applicant, a lawyer, who was also Vice-Chairman of the Trade Union of
the Guadeloupe Bar, decided to participate in a protest by carrying a placard.177 Other
demonstrators were chanting slogans hostile to the police and the judiciary and defaced several
public buildings with graffiti,178 but it was impossible to identify those responsible.179 The court
held, however, that “the freedom to take part in a peaceful assembly…is of such importance that
it cannot be restricted in any way, even for an avocat, so long as the person concerned does not
himself commit any reprehensible act on such an occasion.”180 In other words, the sanction,
however minimal, was not necessary in a democratic society since Ezelin himself did not pose an
immediate threat and any threat he did pose was outweighed by the public’s strong interest in the
freedom to protest government policy.181
B. Duty of Professionalism
Most countries and international organizations recognize the special role which the
lawyer plays in the administration of justice. Under the IST Rules of Procedure and Evidence,
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defense counsel is subject to any codes of practice and ethics governing their profession and, if
applicable, any Code of Professional Conduct established by the President.182
As a result, defense lawyers coming before the SICT would presumably be subject to
IBA rules. Under the IBA’s International Code of Ethics, lawyers must at all times maintain the
honor and dignity of their profession, even in their private lives.183 Following the common law
tradition, the IBA rules also require that lawyer maintain due respect towards the Court at all
times.184 Finally, the loyal defense of a client’s case can never cause a lawyer to be more than
perfectly candid or to knowingly go against the law.185
The Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers promulgated by the United Nations impose
similar restraints on lawyers. Most notably, the Basic Principles specifically require lawyers to
uphold human rights and fundamental freedoms in protecting the rights of their client.186 In
addition, lawyers must act in accordance with recognized standards and ethics of the legal
profession.187 The Council of Europe’s Recommendation on the Freedom of the Exercise of the
Profession of Lawyers requires bar associations to establish professional standards and codes of
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conduct to regulate the behavior of lawyers.188 Also, state bar associations usually require
lawyers to act professionally in the conduct of their work.189
Included in a lawyer’s duty of professionalism is a duty of respect toward the court and
judicial process. As mentioned earlier, lawyers can be sanctioned by the court for interfering
with the administration of justice, even if this means restricting a lawyer’s right to free speech.190
In punishing lawyers’ speech, courts also make a distinction between speech directed at the
prosecution and speech directed at the court process. Courts are more willing to uphold
punishments of attorneys who make disrespectful comments directed at the judiciary such
comments are more likely to interfere with justice than comments directed at the prosecution.191
In Schopfer v. Switzerland, the applicant held a press conference, during which he
declared that the laws and human rights were flagrantly being disregarded at the district authority
offices.192 He claimed he was speaking to the press as a last resort.193 The court found that
“lawyers’ statements to the press always had to be not only of real public interest…but also
objective and moderate in tone.”194 In this case, the human rights violations were unacceptably
exaggerated for a lawyer, especially given the fact that judicial proceedings were pending against
his client.195 Given the modest fine imposed on Schopfer, the court found that the authorities did
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not exceed their margin of appreciation in punishing him, and there was no breach of Article 10
of the European Convention.196
VIII. CAN THE TRIBUNAL INTERFERE WITH HUSSEIN’S LAWYERS’ RIGHT
TO FREE SPEECH?
Because lawyers are under a special duty to uphold justice, the Tribunal can more easily
restrict the speech of Hussein’s lawyers than even the speech of Hussein himself. Mostly likely,
Hussein’s lawyers will argue that any comments they make to the press or in the courtroom are
made solely in zealous defense of their client. For instance, in Khaleel Abood Saleh Aldelami’s
comment to NBC Nightly News, he made it clear that he was speaking for Hussein, not
himself.197 In addition, Hussein’s lawyers will likely argue that since Hussein has had such
limited access to the outside world, then they have an even greater duty to communicate for him.
But, while lawyers have a duty to assist their clients in any way, they can never violate
the law to do so. If Hussein is adjudged guilty of contempt of court for comments he is asking
his lawyers to make, then his lawyers will also be guilty of engaging in such illegal action on
behalf of their client.
Moreover, one could argue that encouraging the insurgency in Iraq goes beyond the
permissible bounds of aiding the client even if Hussein is not found guilty of contempt. As
rational lawyers, they should have known that the statement Hussein wanted them to make
would likely further encourage violent insurgency given the current state of politics in Iraq.
While the lawyers could have legally advocated Hussein’s political opposition to the U.S.
invasion, overthrow of the former government, and installment of a new government, the
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statements encouraging insurgents who have a history of terrorism are vastly different from such
a mere political statement.
Courts have focused not just on the content of lawyers’ speech, but also on the tone.198 In
this case, the Tribunal could find that the tone of the lawyers’ comments was not objective and
moderate; therefore, the lawyers have violated their duty of professionalism under the IST Rules
of Procedure and Evidence via the IBA’s International Code of Ethics. The tone of Hussein’s
lawyers language is questionable since it was made in front of the press in the context of an
ongoing and escalating insurgency in Iraq. However, Aldelami’s speech was filtered through the
press, and the majority of the public was unable to hear Aldelami speak himself, so it is difficult
to evaluate his tone.
In the end, the Tribunal will have to determine the weight of the lawyers’ tone from the
totality of the surrounding circumstances. But, if Hussein’s lawyers again make a public
statement encouraging the insurgency in the context of a trial, the Tribunal will be able to make a
strong case for restricting their speech based on their unprofessional tone. If the comments are
made in court, the Tribunal will have to go through a similar analysis, but in those
circumstances, it might be easier to find that Hussein’s lawyers are interfering with the
administration of justice by questioning the legitimacy of the current Iraqi government, which
includes the Tribunal itself.
IX.

AVAILABLE PUNISHMENT
If the Tribunal does decide to place restrictions on Hussein’s or his counsel’s speech, it

will have available three tentative options: 1) asking the Iraqi Bar Association to bring
disciplinary proceedings against Hussein’s counsel, 2) sanctioning or fining either Hussein or his
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counsel, or 3) placing a “gag order” or other prior restraint on Hussein or his counsel’s speech to
prevent them from inciting the insurgency again in the future. Of course, these restrictions are
not necessarily exclusive; the Tribunal might be able utilize one or more of them for the
defendant or his counsel. Which options are ultimately available will depend in part on the
circumstances in which the speech arises and on the balance between the severity of the threat
and the severity of the restriction. And, of course, the result the Tribunal is seeking to achieve
will determine the appropriateness of a particular option.
A. Disciplinary Proceedings
Where lawyers neglect to act in accordance with their professional standards, appropriate
measures should be taken against them, including disciplinary proceedings.199 According to the
International Bar Association, every lawyers’ association should establish rules for the
commencement and conduct of disciplinary proceedings which incorporate rules of natural
justice.200 Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers can be brought before an impartial
disciplinary committee established by a bar association, before an independent statutory
authority, or before a court, and it must be subject to an independent judicial review.201
Because of their direct and continuous contact with their members, local Bar authorities
and a country’s courts might be in a better position than an international court to determine how,
at a given time, the right balance can be struck between the punishment for certain speech and
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severity of the crime.202 Since the SICT is in part both a domestic and an international court,
there might be some benefit in allowing the Iraqi Bar Association to bring disciplinary hearings
against Hussein’s attorneys. However, the Iraqi Bar Association was recently disbanded and
reformed,203 so it may not be in the position to bring disciplinary proceedings in a timely fashion.
The IST Statute refers to a disciplinary committee created to deal with disciplinary proceedings
against employees of the court,204 but it is unclear whether this committee would have power
over independent defense counsel. Also, the IST Statute does not explicitly confer upon the
Tribunal the power to bring disciplinary proceedings against independent counsel appearing
before it.
Regardless of the Tribunal’s ambiguous power to begin disciplinary proceedings,
disciplinary proceedings may be an inappropriate remedy to address the immediate risk of
inciting the insurgency in Iraq. Disciplinary proceedings are usually a way of dealing with a
lawyer’s inappropriate speech after the fact. Here, however, the Tribunal will most likely want
to ensure that Hussein’s lawyers refrain from encouraging the insurgency during the pendency of
trial. While disciplinary proceedings are intended to deter unprofessional conduct, they do not
serve as immediate deterrents. The actual punishment will not be handed down until the end of
the proceedings, which are shorter than full trials, but still involve a certain amount of process.
In other words, Hussein’s lawyers’ speech will not be punished until long after it is actually
uttered, given the lawyers (or their future replacements) time to continue inciting the insurgency
202
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in Iraq. Consequently, the Tribunal will probably want to avoid using disciplinary proceedings
in favor of a punishment that is more likely to deter future speech.
B. Sanctions
The power of courts to impose sanctions for contempt of court is usually concurrent with
its general contempt power and also seen as an inherent power of the judiciary.205 The principle
of proportionality should be respected when determining sanctions for a disciplinary offense
committed by a lawyer.206 Of course, the Tribunal must also respect the principle of
proportionality under Article 19 of the ICCPR when restricting an individual’s right to free
speech.207
For example, the court in Schopfer v. Switzerland noted that because of the modesty of
the fine imposed upon the defense attorney, the state authorities did not violate his right to free
speech.208 In contrast, the court in Nikula v. Finland held that it was only in exceptional cases
that a restriction of defense counsel’s freedom of expression, even by way of a lenient criminal
sanction, could be accepted as necessary in a democratic society.209
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So, the Tribunal should be able to impose sanctions against both Hussein and his
attorneys in order to restrict comments encouraging the insurgency in so far as such sanctions are
proportional to the threat that the speech poses. Because the court can issue the sanction sua
sponte under its contempt powers, a sanction is a more expedient punishment for incitement than
disciplinary proceedings.
Again, though, sanctions are usually used as punitive measures when an individual fails
to comply with a court order, so they will not prevent the threatening speech from being uttered
in the first place. On the other hand, monetary sanctions may effectively deter undesirable
behavior if the cost on the defendant and his attorneys is high enough but no so high as to violate
the principle of proportionality. Also, as the former President of Iraq, Hussein probably has
more than enough money to afford the cost of sanctions. Even though the assets found by the
U.S. were frozen, Hussein probably had other assets hidden with family and friends; as a result,
sanctions may not deter his behavior at all. So, while the Tribunal could use sanctions to punish
Hussein and his attorneys for inciting insurgency, sanctions alone will not prevent the parties
from encouraging violence again in the future.
C. Gag Orders
The Tribunal has the power to impose a “gag order” upon parties and lawyers in a case
pursuant to its contempt power.210 The best way to assure that neither Hussein nor his counsel
makes comments to the press inciting the insurgency would be to put a “gag order” or a prior
restraint on such speech. Generally, most legal systems recognize that prior restraint on speech
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is extremely dangerous because it amounts to censorship and strongly erodes an individual’s
right to free speech.211
Under the Johannesburg Principles, which are an attempt to codify international law on
free speech, expression cannot be subject to prior censorship in the interests of protecting
national security unless the country is in a state of public emergency which threatens the life of
the country.212 While the Principles do not explicitly require the state to declare a state of public
emergency, the framers might have intended to require such notice since they were relying in
part on the ICCPR, which does require declaration of a national emergency before it can be used
an excuse to derogate from Article 19’s protection of free speech.213
However, this prohibition against prior restraint on speech except in times of national
emergency does not seem internationally to be accepted. The European Court of Human Rights
found that “Article 10 of the [European] Convention does not in terms prohibit the imposition of
prior restrains on publication, as such.”214 Also, in one of the Court’s most cited cases dealing
with restrictions on free speech, the Court found that copies of a book could be confiscated by
the government and publishing could be stopped temporarily because of the government’s
overriding interest in protecting social morals.215 In fact, prior restraints on speech appear to be
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more permissible under the ICCPR, European Convention, and the American Convention than in
the U.S. because the treaties themselves explicitly allow for restrictions on speech.216
In the U.S., there is a strong presumption against prior restraints on speech, but the
presumption is less strong with defendants and lawyers than with the press. Demonstrating that a
lawyer’s comments create substantial likelihood of material prejudice, as opposed to clear and
present danger, is constitutionally sufficient to justify placing restrictions on those comments.217
And, despite its strong presumption in favor of free speech, even the U.S. has permitted
some prior restraints on speech where the restraint was narrowly tailored and the threat posed by
the speech was great. For example, in United States v. Koubriti, in which the defendants were
appealing a conviction of terrorist-related activities, the court held that the only remedial
measure which would prevent prejudice to the parties’ fair trial rights was the imposition of a
limited gag order on the lawyers and the parties given the history of leaks which had undermined
the review of the case.218
Whether a gag order is appropriate in this case, however, will depend on the
circumstances in which the speech arises in court. In many cases in which the court sanctions a
prior restraint of speech, there has been a history of leaking sensitive or prejudicial information,
as in Koubriti. Since the Hussein trial is just beginning, there is as of yet no history of Hussein
or his attorneys inciting insurgency, and the Tribunal cannot find that comments made before
trial interfered with justice before the fact. The speech must be uttered before the Tribunal can
weigh the type of threat it poses to courtroom proceedings. Ultimately, the Tribunal may have to
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wait until Hussein or his attorneys make comments encouraging the insurgency either in court or
in front of the press before they can issue a “gag order” to prohibit such behavior in the future.
If Hussein or his attorneys do make comments inciting the insurgency in Iraq, then the
Tribunal will have to consider whether the threat posed by them is great enough to warrant such
a serious restriction on speech. Given the current situation of political uncertainty and escalating
violence in Iraq, the Tribunal should be able to make a strong argument that the threat of even
greater escalation in insurgency violence warrants a limited restraint on Hussein and his
attorneys’ speech. Of course, the restraint must be narrowly tailored to the circumstances, which
usually means it should be limited in time and application.
X.

CONCLUSION
Ultimately, if Hussein or his defense counsel make comments either in court or out of

court, the Tribunal should be able either to punish such statements or to prevent the release of
such statements in the future via its inherent contempt powers. Given the volatile situation in
Iraq with insurgency violence on the rise, even Hussein’s vague encouragement of the
insurgency will be likely to incite further violence. As a result, it is necessary to restrict
Hussein’s freedom of speech in the greater interest of national security and stability of the new
democracy of Iraq. However, the Tribunal must ensure that whatever measures it takes are
proportional to the threat posed. But, since the threat of the overthrow of the current, democratic
government in Iraq is great, the Tribunal should have some leeway in imposing strong
restrictions on Hussein’s speech. Of course, they cannot restrict vague encouragement as much
as they could direct incitement.
The Tribunal has even greater power to restrict the speech of Hussein’s attorneys because
they owe a special duty to the administration of justice and a special deference to the court.
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Whether Hussein’s lawyers make comments in or out of court inciting the insurgency, they are
still putting the administration of justice at risk in so far as the insurgents seek to get rid of the
Tribunal altogether. While attorneys owe a special duty to argue zealously for their client,
Hussein’s lawyers are never permitted to violate their duties of professionalism. The tone of
speech inciting insurgency alone is unbecoming of a professional advocate; therefore, the
Tribunal should be able to restrict Hussein’s lawyers’ speech as necessary to protect the due
administration of justice during Hussein’s trial.
Finally, the Tribunal has three choices of restrictions to impose on either Hussein or his
attorneys for speech inciting the insurgency in Iraq. The Tribunal may ask the Iraqi Bar
Association to bring disciplinary proceedings against Hussein’s attorneys, but since the Bar
Association was recently disbanded, this may not be a feasible option. Not to mention,
disciplinary proceedings will not have a quick deterrent effect. The Tribunal may also sanction
Hussein or his attorneys sua sponte for contempt of court. While the Tribunal can impose
sanctions more quickly than disciplinary proceedings, sanctions, too, might lack the desired
deterrent effect because, as a former head of state, Hussein undoubtedly has the money to pay
them.
Perhaps the best way to prevent the utterance of speech inciting the insurgency in and out
of the courtroom is to place a limited “gag order” or prior restraint on speech on both Hussein
and his attorneys. While prior restraints on speech are meant to be the last resort in restricting
speech, it is the only way to prevent both Hussein and his attorneys from making further
comments to the press and the courtroom encouraging the insurgency. In imposing a prior
restraint on speech, though, the Tribunal must take care to narrowly tailor the restraint in time
and content covered.
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